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Article 6

Anonymity in Civil Litigation: The "Doe" Plaintiff
In recent years, an increasing number of case captions feature
"Roe" and "Doe" plaintiffs. Although the most prominent of these
cases involve abortion, birth control, or other controversial and sensitive issues, plaintiffs have maintained anonymity in a wide variety of
other contexts. All of these cases share a need to forego the usual
procedure of disclosing identity in the complaint to protect plaintiffs
from a threatened harm or prevent public intrusion into an area of
utmost intimacy.
The Supreme Court of the United States, though tacitly approving anonymous plaintiff practice,' has yet to decide a case where the
right to proceed anonymously is at issue.2 Lower courts have discussed competing policy considerations, but have not established
standards for determining when plaintiffs may use pseudonyms.
This note examines Doe plaintiff practice and the policy considerations that courts must balance when plaintiffs seek anonymity. Part I
treats the mechanics of Doe plaintiff practice; Part II discusses the
policy of full disclosure; Part III examines circumstances warranting
anonymity; and Part IV integrates competing policy interests to provide courts with specific analytical guidelines for determining when
to permit plaintiffs to use fictitious names.
I.

The Mechanics of Doe Plaintiff Practice

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) provides that "[i]n the
complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the
parties." Although this rule appears to prohibit Doe plaintiff practice, courts have nonetheless permitted pseudonyms in limited circumstances. The proper procedure for obtaining such court
approval depends largely on the particular court's construction of
Rule 10(a).
Strict judicial construction of Rule 10(a) is illustrated in Roe V.
New York ,3 where the district court ruled "that if a complaint does
not identify any plaintiff in the title or otherwise, then its filing is

1

The Supreme Court implicitly recognized Doe plaintiffs in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2 Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 189 (5th Cir. 1981). (Gee, J., dissenting).
3 49 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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ineffective to commence an action. ' 4 Plaintiffs R. Roe, M. Moe, S.
Soe, and J. Joe filed a complaint seeking an injunction and money
damages after receiving inadequate care in state training schools.
When the defendants moved to dismiss, plaintiffs' counsel offered to
divulge the plaintiffs' true names under protective provisions. Plaintiffs also submitted affidavits revealing their true names. Despite this
limited disclosure of identity, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that they had not commenced an action. The
court reasoned that "[i]f no action had been commenced by the filing
of this complaint, then the subsequent disclosure of the true names of
'5
plaintiffs did not change the situation."
Not all decisions share Roe v. New York's mechanical construction
of Rule 10(a). Liberally interpreting Rule 10(a), many courts recognize the commencement of an action when plaintiffs file anonymously. 6 Emphasizing that fictitious names present "real and
specific aggrieved individuals,"'7 these courts allow anonymous plaintiffs who demonstrate a particular need to conceal their identity.
Courts permit Doe plaintiff practice by issuing a protective order. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) gives the trial court discretion over litigants' requests for protection from annoyance,
embarrassment, or oppression in the discovery process, 8 and this dis4 Id. at 281.
5 Id. at 282.
6 See Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1980). In Borup, the court rejected the
"highly mechanical interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . [that] would
have the court elevate form over substance, without any reason for doing so." Id. at 129.
Further rejection of the Roe v. New York formalistic interpretation was contained in Doe v.
Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974), which noted that since Roe v. New York, "a
host of cases have been prosecuted under fictitious names. Sometimes the fact of the fictitious
name is noted and other times it is not, but it is clear that a practice has developed permitting
individuals to sue under fictitious names where the issues involved are matters of a sensitive
and highly personal nature."
7 Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The requirement that
the pseudonyms represent real and specific aggrieved individuals reflects concerns of justiciability. To have standing, the plaintiff "must allege some threatened or actual injury
resulting from the putatively illegal action." Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
(1973). The court also should acquire a sufficient basis to continually ensure that the case has
not become moot.
8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides:
Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery
is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the
deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense ....
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cretion includes the authority to protect plaintiff anonymity. 9 After
filing under a pseudonym, a plaintiff may request a protective order
to maintain anonymity throughout the litigation. Often courts grant
limited permission to initiate the suit anonymously, and then consider the merits of the anonymity claim presented in submitted memoranda before granting a more permanent protective order.' 0
Although more liberal courts have recognized plaintiffs who file
anonymously, the plaintiff who employs a pseudonym gambles on
how the court will interpret Rule 10(a), and risks dismissal without
even the opportunity to demonstrate why he must conceal his identity. Roe v. New York suggests three alternatives that allow plaintiffs
desiring anonymity to avoid the risk of dismissal:
(1) filing a complaint under the plaintiffs true name, and then
requesting a protective order or leave to amend the complaint to
shield the plaintiffs identity;
(2) using pseudonyms in the complaint but setting forth the
plaintiff's true name in an attached letter; or
(3) using a fictitious name in the complaint but verifying the
complaint by signing the plaintiffs true name." These alternatives
avoid a purely procedural bar to proceeding anonymously, and allow
the court to consider whether the circumstances warrant the use of
fictitious names.
Beyond the procedural hurdles to protecting identity, plaintiffs
face a difficult burden of substantively justifying their anonymity.
Courts grant permission to proceed anonymously only in rare instances, and Rule 10(a) continues to dictate a general practice that
plaintiffs sue by their true names.

II. Policy of Full Disclosure
Anonymous plaintiff practice goes contrary to the basic princi9 Although the federal rule does not explicitly authorize plaintiff anonymity, courts
have extended the rule and exercise broad discretion to shield plaintiffs' identities. See Doe v.
Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
10 For example, in Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973), the district court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed tentatively under pseudonyms. It then required
the parties to submit memoranda addressing whether a permanent protective order should be
granted. Similarly, in Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1980), the court permitted
the plaintiffs to use pseudonyms for ten days after filing, and then fully considered the plaintiffs' request to maintain anonymity throughout the litigation.
11 Se Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Plaintiffs using the third
alternative should provide a reason for the procedure, or the court may substitute the plaintiff's real name for the fictitious name in the case caption. See, .g., Male v. Crossroads Assocs., 320 F. Supp. 141, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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pie that one who commences a lawsuit avouches the cause before the
court and the public. Fundamental fairness dictates that when a
plaintiff sues a defendant by name, and thereby identifies the defendant to the public, the plaintiff should likewise reveal his or her own
identity.' 2 Even when the defendant is not a private party, but
rather the government, "there is something to be said . . .for the
notion that one who strikes the king should do so unmasked or not at
3
all."'
Both the defendant and the public have definite interests in
knowing the plaintiff's identity. The defendant needs to know the
plaintiff's identity to fully use the discovery process and establish appropriate defenses. Plaintiff pseudonyms can effectively preclude defendants' access to vital information and unfairly insulate plaintiffs'
claims from valid defenses.' 4 In addition, proceeding anonymously
creates a possible inability to determine the res judicata effect of
15
judgment.
Besides the defendant's interest in knowing the opposing litigant's identity, the public has a "legitimate interest in knowing all
the facts and events surrounding court proceedings."'16 The Supreme
Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,' 7 though specifically
holding that the first amendment guarantees public access to criminal
trials,' 8 noted that "historically both civil and criminal trials have
been presumptively open."' 9 Because of the presumption of openness, any attempt to restrict public scrutiny of judicial proceedings
20
implicates the first amendment guarantee of access to trial.
Use of fictitious names does not bar the public from attending
trials, but does bar public dissemination of information. This bar
contravenes the Supreme Court's declaration that "[a] trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property ...
There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as
distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to
suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before
12 Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979).
13 Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 189 (5th Cir. 1981) (Gee, J., dissenting).
14 This consequence may be avoided if the court discloses the plaintiff's true name to the
defendant, and merely bars public disclosure of the plaintiff's identity. See, e.g., Doe v. Ste-

gall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
15 Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
16 Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 160 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
17 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
18 Id. at 580.
19 Id.at n.17.
20 Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981).

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1982]

''

Rule 10(a), requiring plaintiffs to sue by their true names, reflects the presumption of public access to information arising from a
trial. Filing a complaint under one's true name is not only a procedural formality, but is also an acknowledgement of the openness of
the American judicial process. Any departure from this practice of
full disclosure must overcome the strong presumption against shielding identity from opposing parties and the public.
it. 21

III.

Circumstances Warranting Anonymity

Notwithstanding the strong presumption of judicial openness,
particular cases have presented circumstances warranting plaintiff
anonymity. These cases may be divided into two groups: (1) cases
where concealed identity is necessary to protect the plaintiff from a
threatened harm; and (2) cases where concealed identity is necessary
to protect the plaintiff's privacy in matters of utmost intimacy.
A.

Threatened Harm

One of the strongest justifications for proceeding anonymously
arises when disclosure of identity would cause the harm that the
plaintiff's action seeks to prevent. Roe v. Ingraham22 presented such a
situation. Plaintiffs in Ingraham were doctors who prescribed and
their patients who received medication that the New York State
Controlled Substances Act 23 classified as "Schedule II drugs. '24 The
Act required prescribing physicians to file with the state a copy of an
official New York State prescription form that included the patient's
name and address. Plaintiffs, filing under pseudonyms, alleged that
the Act "by requiring disclosure of the identity of certain patients
• . . invades the patient's right of privacy and confidentiality. ' 25
The district court allowed the patients to proceed anonymously, observing that "if plaintiffs are required to reveal their identity prior to
the adjudication on the merits of their privacy claim, they will already have sustained the injury which by this litigation they seek to
21 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1975), quoting Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
22 364 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
23 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 3300 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
24 Schedule II drugs are defined as "those substances which have a high potential for
abuse, but also have an accepted or restricted medical use. Abuse of a Schedule II substance
may lead to severe physiological dependence." 364 F. Supp. at 538, quoting INTERIM REPORT
OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE DRUG LAWS at 13.
25 Id. at 540.
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avoid." 26
The federal district court for the Northern District of California,
in Doe v. Rostker, 27 set limits to the Ingraham rationale for shielding
identity. The plaintiffs in Rosiker were nineteen-year-old males who
were required to register with the Selective Service. Filing as Doe,
Roe, and Moe, the plaintiffs alleged that the mandatory registration
violated their right of privacy. The plaintiffs echoed the Ingraham
argument in contending that "compelled disclosure of their identities
would vitiate the interests they seek to protect. ' 28 The court rejected
this argument and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend by
stating the parties' true names.
The court in Rostker distinguished Ingraham by reasoning that
identification in Ingraham, revealing use of controlled substances,
would bear "an element of stigmatization" not found in Rostker. 29
Furthermore, the court emphasized a more fundamental shortcoming in the asserted justification for anonymity in Rostker: the
threatened injury to the plaintiffs was neither substantial nor certain.
The court observed:
Plaintiffs argue they should be allowed to proceed anonymously because they fear retaliatory conduct or other reprisals which may
jeopardize their attempts to obtain conscientious objector status in
the future. This feared retaliation is both speculative and prospective. .

.

. The court fails to see what real injury would inure to

plaintiffs by proceeding under their own names.30

The court in Rostker refused to permit anonymity essentially because the plaintiffs failed to show imminent retaliatory conduct or
injury. Where plaintiffs have successfully shown actual threatened
harm, courts have demonstrated greater receptiveness to requests to
maintain anonymity. Actual threatened harm that warrants ano31
nymity may be physical, social, or economic.
Doe v.Lall 3 2 graphically illustrates the need for anonymity
26 Id. at 541 n.7.
27 89 F.R.D. 158 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
28 Id. at 161.
29 Id. at 162.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Doe v. Lally, 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979) (threatened physical harm);
Glover v. Johnson, 85 F.R.D. I (E.D. Mich. 1977) (threatened physical harm); Doe v. Hodgson, 344 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (threatened economic harm); Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (threatened economic harm); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d
180 (5th Cir. 1981) (threatened social and physical harm).
32 467 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1979).
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when physical harm is threatened. The plaintiff, confined to a state
diagnostic center, sought injunctive and declaratory relief after he
was homosexually raped.33 The district court recognized rape victims' fear of reprisal and the stigma attaching to a known rape victim
that "serves to single out an inmate as an easy mark, thereby increasing the likelihood of further sexual assaults. '3 4 This harm likely to
result upon disclosure of the plaintiff's identity warrant the plaintiff's
use of a pseudonym.
Threatened harms short of the physical harm in Lally may nevertheless be substantial enough to justify plaintiff anonymity. In Doe
v.Slegall,3 5 plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of prayer and
Bible reading in Mississippi public schools feared social harassment
and violence should their names be publicly disclosed. To support
their fears, the plaintiffs presented documentary exhibits demonstrating hostile community sentiment toward their suit. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to
sue anonymously, but emphasized that in granting the plaintiffs' request, it had not merely considered the threatened social harm.
The threat of hostile public reaction to a lawsuit, standing alone,
will only with great rarity warrant public anonymity. But the
threats of violence generated by this case, in conjunction with the
other factors weighing in favor of maintaining the Does' anonymbalance against the customary practice of judicial
ity, tip the
36
openness.
Besides physical and social harm, threatened employer reprisal
or economic harm may warrant plaintiff anonymity. In Gmez v.
Buckeye Sugars,37 migrant farmworkers sued their employers for fail-

ing to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act and other federal
statutes. Plaintiffs filed under the fictitious names of Juan Gomez
and Richardo Lopez "in order to safeguard against any possible reprisals by their employers that might result from the filing of this
lawsuit," 3 8 and sought a protective order to conceal their true names.
The defendants argued that such a protective order was unnecessary
since persons alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act are
33 The plaintiff alleged that the rape was a direct result of prison officials' failure to
maintain proper security and control in the institution.
34 467 F. Supp. at 1348-49. Because of fear of reprisal, few inmates report homosexual
assaults. Id. at 1349.
35 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
36 Id. at 186. The "other factors" weighing in favor of anonymity included the plaintiffs'
privacy interest in their religious beliefs. See text accompanying note 74 infta.
37 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
38 Id. at 106.
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protected against employer reprisals. 39 The court nonetheless issued
the protective order, observing that "[t]he method proposed by the
plaintiffs affords them a higher degree of security than does the statutory provision." 4
The Gomez court's willingness to allow plaintiffs seeking protection from employer reprisal to maintain anonymity is sharply contrasted in Southern Methodist Universi Ass'n v. WJnne &Jafe.41 The
SMU Association of Women Law Students and four female lawyers
brought Title VII sex discrimination suits against two Dallas law
firms, alleging that the firms' hiring practices discriminated against
women. The four lawyers requested a protective order to proceed
anonymously, fearing economic and social harm should their participation in the suit become known. In sealed affidavits, the lawyers
stated that they would "be eased out" or "assigned less desirable matters" if their names were publicly disclosed. 42 One lawyer asserted
"that her firm would likely lose business should her identity become
known."'4 3 The court denied the protective order, and stated that the
lawyers "face no greater threat of warranted retaliation than the typical plaintiff alleging Title VII violations." 44
The Fifth Circuit in SMU narrowly limited justifications for
proceeding anonymously, and identified factors common to cases
permitting plaintiff anonymity that were not present in the SMU
case.
[TIhe cases affording plaintiffs anonymity all share several characteristics missing here. The plaintiffs in those actions, at the least,
divulged personal information of the utmost intimacy; many also
had to admit that they either had violated state laws or government
regulations or wished to engage in prohibited conduct .... Furthermore, all of the plaintiffs previously allowed in other cases to
proceed anonymously were challenging the constitutional,
statutory
or regulatory validity of government activity. 45
Not all cases allowing plaintiff anonymity share the "common"
39

29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976) makes it unlawful:
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or cause to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter [Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938], or
has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to
serve on an industry committee.

40 60 F.R.D. at 107.
41
42
43
44
45

599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id. at 713.
Id.
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characteristics listed in SMU.46 For example, in Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, plaintiffs did not divulge intimate or personal information, did
not admit engaging in illegal conduct, and did not challenge government activity. The SMU court did not need to articulate missing
characteristics to disallow plaintiff pseudonyms, for the court essentially held that the gravity of the threatened harm simply was insufficient to justify shielding identity. No court has yet set forth criteria

explaining when threatened harm becomes grave enough to warrant
anonymity, and the determination of whether to allow plaintiff
47
pseudonyms continues to be an ad hoc process.

B. Matters of Utmost Intimagy
The court in SMU recognized that many actions successfully
maintained by Doe plaintiffs involve "personal information of the
utmost intimacy. '48 When the nature of a lawsuit forces a plaintiff
to disclose highly personal information, the implicated right to privacy 49 may justify shielding identity. The right to privacy, guaranteed by emanations from the Bill of Rights, 50 "encompasses and
protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage,
46 Discussing the SMU analysis, the court in Doe v. Stegall, stated, "[W]e think it would
be a mistake to distill a rigid, three-step test for the propriety of party anonymity from the
fact-sensitive holding in Southern Methodist University Ass'n. The opinion never purports to
establish the three common factors it isolates as prerequisites to bringing an anonymous suit."
653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981).
47 Although each court must exercise discretion, the lack of uniform standards in evaluating requests for anonymity offers little predictability and notice to prospective Doe
plaintiffs.
48 599 F.2d at 713.
49 The right to privacy was first suggested in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to I'rVaty, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Although the Constitution does not expressly provide for a right
of privacy, the Supreme Court has based the right of privacy upon various guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), the Court explained:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of
decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacift R. Co. v.Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In
varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the
roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v.Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v.Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968),
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), see Olmstead . UnitedStates, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484485; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Meyer v.Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
50 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (Connecticut law forbidding use
of contraceptives held unconstitutional), Justice Douglas explained that "specific guarantees
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motherhood, procreation, and child rearing."'5 t Courts balance the
plaintiff's privacy interest against the consequences to the defendant
and to the public resulting from plaintiff anonymity. Plaintiffs do
not have an absolute right to use pseudonyms, but cases that expose
the plaintiff's personal intimacies strongly justify anonymity.
The Supreme Court has stated that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."'52 In accordance with this fundamental privacy interest, plaintiffs who bring cases involving pregnancy and childbearing
are commonly permitted to employ pseudonyms. The Supreme
Court has never discussed the merits of plaintiff anonymity, but has
tacitly acknowledged the propriety of Doe plaintiffs when unmarried
and pregnant women anonymously challenged criminal abortion
statutes in Roe v. Wade53 and Doe v. Bolton.54 The Court's most explicit approval of plaintiff anonymity is contained in Poe v. Ullman,-5
where the Court merely noted that the Connecticut court had ap56
proved plaintiff pseudonyms in the special circumstances.
The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors more fully discussed
the special circumstances in Ullman when it ruled on the case. 57 One
Dr. Buxton and five of his patients, Jane Doe, Paul and Pauline Poe,
and Harold and Hanna Hoe, challenged the constitutionality of
Connecticut's statutory ban on contraceptives. Dr. Buxton prescribed contraceptives to the female plaintiffs, for whom pregnancy
would seriously endanger health. The Connecticut court allowed the
patients to maintain anonymity, observing that "[b]ecause of the intimate and distressing details alleged in these complaints, it is understandable that the parties who are allegedly medical patients would
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance. . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy."
51 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).
52 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons held unconstitutional).
53 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The plaintiff's alias affidavit filed with the district court satisfied
the Supreme Court that the plaintiff was not fictitious. Id. at 124. Except for acknowledging
that the plaintiff was a real person, the Court did not discuss plaintiff anonymity.
54 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Court noted that, as established in Roe v.Wade, "despite her
pseudonym, we may accept as true, for this case, Mary Doe's existence and her pregnant
state." Id. at 187.
55 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
56 ld. at 498 n.l.
57 Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508 (Conn. 1959).
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wish to be anonymous."5 8
Doe v. Deschamfps 59 similarly discussed anonymity for matters of
utmost intimacy. Plaintiffs Jane Doe and John Moe, a pregnant woman and her doctor, challenged the constitutionality of Montana's
abortion statute. Because the complaint contained detailed information about the woman's personal life, the district court allowed the
woman to use a pseudonym. The court explained, "We think that as
a matter of policy the identity of the parties to a lawsuit should not
be concealed except in the unusual case. The intensely personal na'60
ture of pregnancy does, we believe, create such an unusual case."
However, unlike its revelation of the woman's private life, the complaint merely exposed the doctor's professional or economic life. Because the doctor did not present a similarly compelling personal
privacy interest, the court required the doctor to proceed under his
61
true name.
Besides pregnancy and childbirth, circumstances involving sexual conduct and family relations have also warranted plaintiff anonymity. In Roe v. Borup ,62 a minor child and her parents sought
damages after the state temporarily removed the child from the parents' custody. The removal action was founded on allegations that
the parents had sexually abused the child, and the district court regarded it "beyond argument" that the matters involved were highly
sensitive. 63 Particularly because public revelation of the allegations
of sexual abuse would subject the plaintiffs to substantial social harassment and embarrassment, plaintiff pseudonyms were found to be
appropriate.
Courts have also acknowledged homosexuality and transsexuality to be matters of the utmost intimacy. In Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 64 the Virginia district court allowed homosexuals challenging the constitutionality of Virginia's sodomy statute to use pseudonyms. Similarly, in Doe v. McConn ,65 anonymous transsexuals
challenged a Houston city ordinance which prohibited transvestites
from appearing publicly in women's clothing. 66 The district court
58
59

Id. at 514-15.

60

Id. at 653.

64 F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 1974).

61 Id.
62 500 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
63 Id. at 130.
64 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
65 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
66 Section 28-42.4 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Houston provides, "It shall be
unlawful for any person to appear on any public street, sidewalk, alley, or other public thor-
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stated that the plaintiffs, "in various stages of sexual transition, are
suing under fictitious names to insulate themselves from possible harassment, to protect their privacy, and'67to protect themselves from
prosecution resulting from this action."
The need for anonymity in both Commonwealth-s Attom and McConn was especially pronounced since disclosure of identity might
subject plaintiffs to public harassment or criminal prosecution. By
contrast, in Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. ,68 where the plaintiff had
already been tried and acquitted on criminal charges of offering to
engage in an act of lewdness, 69 the Tenth Circuit stated that the
plaintiff "had already suffered the worst of the publicity, ' 70 and denied permission to use a pseudonym in the subsequent civil action.
Lindsey indicates that when matters of personal privacy have already
been publicly divulged in other contexts, the asserted privacy interest
yields to the presumption of judicial openness.
Courts have recognized compelling privacy interests in non-sexual contexts, including cases involving mental illness 7 1 and abandoned or illegitimate children. 72 An example of a judicially
recognized privacy interest far removed from matters of sexual intimacy was presented in Doe v. Stegall,73 where plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of prayer and Bible reading in public schools. Besides acknowledging threatened social harassment and violence, the
oughfare dressed with the designed intent to disguise his or her true sex as that of the opposite
sex." Id. at 79.
67 Id. at 77.
68 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1979).
69 Lindsey had allegedly attempted to persuade a Target store employee to engage in a
homosexual act. Id. at 1120.
70 Id. at 1125.
71 See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (plaintiff who had been
involuntarily committed to state hospital challenging civil commitment statute); Doe v. Harris, 495 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (plaintiff who had been hospitalized for paranoid
schizophrenia applying for disability benefits); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3rd Cir. 1979)
(plaintiff who had been hospitalized in a private psychiatric institution challenging medical
assistance statute); and Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (plaintiff who
left medical school because of a mental disability seeking readmission to medical school).
72 See, e.g., Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (state welfare recipient
challenging statute requiring recipients' cooperation in prosecuting spouses for non-support of
children); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (mothers of needy and illegitimate children challenging statute requiring mothers' cooperation in identifying the father);
Doe v. Hursh, 337 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1970) (applicants for Aid to Families with Dependent Children challenging rule denying benefits until a parent has been continuously absent
from home for 90 days); and Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969) (mothers of
illegitimate children challenging regulation providing for termination of welfare payments on
mother's failure to identify the father).
73 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Fifth Circuit recognized a privacy interest in personal religious beliefs, stating that "religion is perhaps the quintessentially private
matter. ' 74 The court considered this privacy interest as one factor in
a balancing process which led the court to protect plaintiff anonymity. The court reasoned:
We advance no hard and fast formula for ascertaining whether a
party may sue anonymously. The decision requires a balancing of
considerations calling for maintenance of a party's privacy against
the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of
openness in judicial proceedings. We emphasize the special status
and vulnerability of the child-litigants, the showing of possible
threatened harm and serious social ostracization based upon militant religious attitudes, and fundamental privateness of the religious beliefs, all of which are at the core of this suit to vindicate
establishment clause rights. We conclude that the almost universal
practice of disclosure
must give way in this case to the privacy inter75
ests at stake.
IV.

A Suggested Approach

The Stegall court's balancing test is the most definitive standard
to date for determining whether plaintiffs may proceed anonymously. However, Judge Gee, dissenting in Stegall, argued that this
balancing process provides little guidance for future decisions concerning Doe plaintiff practice. Judge Gee writes:
The majority tells our courts below little more than that, in future,
we will decide the matter when it gets to us. Nothing objective is
offered, "no hard and fast formula." But it is just such formulas,
or
76
at least a sketching of their outlines, that we sit to provide.
Although there is no hard and fast rule that could apply to every
case, certain guidelines may provide an analytical framework for determining when to allow plaintiff anonymity. Courts should evaluate both the particular justifications for shielding the plaintiff's
identity and the countervailing interests in disclosure to make a principled determination of whether a pseudonym is appropriate.
A. Justfieationsfor Shielding Identity
A court faced with a plaintiff's request to maintain anonymity
should initially determine whether the pseudonym serves to protect
74
75
76

Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 188 (Gee, J., dissenting).
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the plaintiff from a threatened harm or to prevent public disclosure
of intimate information. Either purpose may warrant the use of
pseudonyms, and cases substantially presenting both justifications
particularly merit plaintiff anonymity.
1. Evaluating Threatened Harm
In evaluating whether the threatened harm warrants shielding
the plaintiff's identity, courts should consider three factors: (1) the
nature and gravity of the threatened harm; (2) the probability that
the threatened harm will actually occur; and (3) the nexus between
shielding identity and avoiding the harm.
Different kinds of harm should receive varying consideration in
evaluating justifications for anonymity. Threatened physical harm
presents the strongest justification for proceeding anonymously.
When disclosure of identity would endanger the plaintiffs personal
safety or physical well-being, courts should customarily permit plaintiff pseudonyms.
Threatened social and economic harm, as opposed to threatened
physical harm, present less persuasive justifications for using pseudonyms and require a closer examination of the gravity of the potential harm. The gravity of the threatened harm may vary greatly
from case to case. Certainly, harm as severe as losing one's job or
suffering oppressive social ostracism should receive considerable
weight in allowing plaintiffs to maintain anonymity. Because litigants commonly risk financial setbacks and social disapproval, however, courts should not permit a plaintiff to thwart the policy of
judicial openness merely because the suit may bring financial loss or
social embarrassment.
No matter how severe the harm which a plaintiff claims will
result from public disclosure of identity, the court must also evaluate
the probability that the harm will actually occur. If the harm is
merely imagined or speculative, the court should deny permission to
proceed anonymously. 7 Plaintiffs should present affidavits or other
evidence to demonstrate a probability of harm. Unless the court is
convinced that harm is actually threatened, it should not protect the
plaintiff's anonymity.
Shielding the plaintiffs identity would be meaningless unless the
measure successfully prevents the threatened harm. Plaintiffs must,
therefore, demonstrate a substantial nexus between maintaining ano77 See, e.g., Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158 (N.D. Cal. 1981), and text accompanying note
30 supra.
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nymity and avoiding the harm. Where the harm will likely occur
despite the pseudonym, or where the plaintiff has already suffered
the harm 7 8 the court should not approve the unusual procedure of
employing fictitious names.
2.

Evaluating Matters of Utmost Intimacy

Though evaluating threatened harm is necessarily subjective,
determining when an asserted privacy interest justifies shielding
identity is even less amenable to a rigid formula. In evaluating the
plaintiff's privacy interest, courts should ask: (1) whether the plaintiff's personal life is brought into the suit; (2) whether the matter is
one of utmost intimacy; and, (3) whether a pseudonym would effectively prevent public access to the intimate information. Affirmative
answers to all three questions present strong justification for proceeding anonymously.
A threshold determination is whether each plaintiff seeking anonymity brings his or her personal life into the lawsuit. When the
action involves not the plaintiff's, but rather someone else's, personal
79
life, the court should not shield the plaintiff's identity.
Once determining that the suit involves matters broadly within
the plaintiff's personal life, the court must determine whether these
matters are of utmost intimacy. The plaintiff must demonstrate that
the asserted privacy interest falls within a realm of personal privacy
that the public and the judicial process have little reason to enter.
This realm of privacy includes "personal intimacies of the home, the
family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." 80
There is no absolute formula that delineates "personal intimacies."
Courts should maintain flexibility to recognize privacy interests in
one's body, emotions, needs, feelings, beliefs, and integral human
relationships.
If the matter presented is indeed of the utmost intimacy, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that proceeding anonymously would effectively block public access to the intimate information. If the information has already been subjected to public scrutiny, either through
pretrial publicity or a prior judicial proceeding,8 1 little justification
78 See, e.g., Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1979), where the
plaintiff had already suffered the publicity of a criminal trial.
79 For example, in Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 1974), the court refused
to permit the doctor to proceed anonymously when the suit involved only his patient's personal life. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
80 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).
81 Set, e.g., Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1979).
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remains for shielding identity. Similarly, if in spite of the pseudonym, the public would still gain access to the information through
other means, the presumption of judicial openness should override
the plaintiff's privacy interest.
B.

CountervailingConcerns

The interest in disclosing the plaintiff's true identity is not
merely a statement of general policy, but rather entails specific concerns that vary with the facts of each case. The court should evaluate
the consequences of shielding the plaintiff's identity and the need for
disclosure as they relate particularly to justiciability, discovery, the
enforceability of relief, and the public interest in knowing the plaintiff's identity.
1. Justiciability
Plaintiff anonymity affects two important aspects of justiciability: standing and mootness. The court must initially find that
the plaintiff has standing to bring the suit. Specifically, the court
must ascertain that the fictitious name represents a real person who
was in fact injured by the law or conduct at issue. Courts that require the plaintiff to file a sealed alias affidavit receive assurance that
the plaintiff is a real person. 82 Courts might also require the plaintiff
to reveal his or her true name in camera. A judge's active participation in the pretrial process may lead to further confirmation that the
plaintiff has standing to bring the suit. The court should require the
continuing existence of real parties with standing as a condition to
maintaining anonymity.
Besides ensuring that the plaintiff has standing, the court must
continually ensure that the case has not become moot. For example,
a court hearing a case brought by an inmate must confirm that the
plaintiff remains confined at the time of trial.83 The court must ob82 Se, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973).
83 Release from confinement or transfer to another institution does not moot claims for
money damages, however. Doe v. Lally, 467 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Md. 1979). A prisoner's
transfer or release also does not moot claims for injunctive relief if the alleged deprivation is
capable of repetition yet evading review. In Lally, for example, the plaintiff was homosexually raped while confined to a temporary prison facility and was transferred to another institution by the time of trial. Because the plaintiff was no longer subject to the alleged
deprivation, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's suit for declaratory and injunctive relief
was moot. The Court ruled that the case was not moot. It stated that "[u]nless courts adopt a
liberal attitude towards mootness aspects of civil rights claims brought in connection with
alleged deprivations occurring at temporary prison facilities, such claims will continue to recur and escape adjudication." Id. at 1342-43.
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tain sufficient facts, through sealed affidavits or in camera revelation
of the plaintiff's true name, to monitor mootness throughout the
litigation.
2.

Discovery

Courts should not allow plaintiff pseudonyms to preclude defendants' full use of the discovery process. Where the pseudonym
becomes an offensive means to thwart the opposing litigant's defenses, rather than a protective measure, courts should require the
plaintiff to reveal his or her true name to the defendant. This limited
disclosure still protects the plaintiff from outside harm and public
invasion of personal privacy while maintaining fairness in the
84
litigation.
3.

Enforceability of Relief

When an anonymous plaintiff seeks specific relief, any remedy
ordered by the court may require the court, and sometimes also the
defendant, to know the plaintiff's true name. In such cases, the court
should require limited disclosure of the plaintiff's identity. A plaintiff seeking anonymity must realize that such limited disclosure is
necessary if the desired remedy is to be effective.
4.

Public Interest in Knowing the Plaintiff's Identity

The public interest in knowing the facts surrounding a trial is
relatively constant. The public enjoys a historical presumption of
full access to judicial proceedings and information.8 5 However, the
public interest in knowing a particular plaintiff's identity varies from
case to case. For example, the public may have little interest in
knowing the identity of a private plaintiff challenging action directed
only at the plaintiff.8 6 Conversely, where the plaintiff raises issues
which affect the public at large, the public may have a heightened
interest in knowing the plaintiff's identity. Especially where the
plaintiff is a public official and owes the public a special fiduciary
duty, the court should not allow a plaintiff's pseudonym to block
public scrutiny.
84 See, e.g., Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs agreed to disclose their
true names to the court and to the defendant).
85 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
86 See, e.g., Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (parents sought damages
after the state temporarily removed their child from parental custody).
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V.

Conclusion

Courts should allow plaintiffs who file anonymously to present
justifications for their use of pseudonyms, and should not mechanically interpret Rule 10(a) to dismiss anonymous complaints. Although a plaintiff never has the right to use a pseudonym, a plaintiff
may justify the privilege of anonymity by demonstrating threatened
harm or a substantial privacy interest. After the plaintiff presents
justifications for concealing identity, the court must determine what
measure of concealment is appropriate. Courts should consider alternatives to total concealment, such as in camera revelation of the plaintiff's true name, whenever concerns of justiciability, discovery, or
enforceability of relief are implicated.
The ultimate determination of whether to shield the plaintiff's
identity remains within the court's discretion. However, the suggested analytical guidelines facilitate a reasoned determination of
when circumstances warrant plaintiff anonymity. Concealing the
plaintiff's identity should remain a highly unusual procedure, and
only exceptional circumstances should prompt courts to shield the
Doe plaintiff.
Wendy M Rosenberger

